In the first Newsletter on this topic (Part I of my paper), I used the term "masochistic group death" to describe the meaning of Germany's participation in the Second World War. This term, actually, came from a paper on Jonestown, “The Cult Leader as Agent of a Psychotic Fantasy of Masochistic Group Death: The ‘Revolutionary Suicide’ in Jonestown.” The term "masochistic group death" is applicable to what occurred art Jonestown, and equally applicable to what happened to Germany at the end of the Second World War. In each instance, we are talking about group suicide.

Another article examining the Jonestown mass suicide from a clinical psychology perspective is “The Group Psychology of Mass Madness.”

The authors propose the concept of “collective pathological regression within a charismatically led mass movement.” Their analysis of Reverend Jim Jones shows how his actions triggered the “mass madness that engulfed the inhabitants of Jonestown.”

The following terms, then, were used by the two mental health professionals I have cited in their analysis of the mass suicide at Jonestown: psychotic fantasy, masochistic group death, revolutionary suicide, mass madness and collective psychological regression.

These terms are equally applicable to what occurred in Germany at the end of the Second World War. Yet I've never heard these terms used my historians. Why not?

We witness in the final days of the Third Reich a case of mass slaughter on a scale that dwarfs what occurred at Jonestown. During the last year of the war, 1945, nearly 900 Germans died every two hours, every day, for four consecutive months. If terms like “masochistic group death,” “revolutionary suicide” and “mass madness” aptly describe what occurred at Jonestown, these terms also apply to what occured in Germany at the end of the war.

Yet in 45 years of research, I do not recall a clinical study of mass death in Germany at the end of the Second World comparable to the ones I have cited on the Jonestown suicide--that frame what occurred as a profound form of psychopathology. There are a few studies of Hitler's psychopathology (although even these have gone out of fashion), but rarely do we find studies of the psychopathology of German society.

We find it so easy to write about the psychopathogy of individuals and cults, yet difficult to conceptualize large-scale social and political movements as forms of psychopathology—however bizarre and massively destructive they may be. Why is this the case?

Although historians rarely have address warfare and genocide as forms of psychopathology, 9/11 and Islamic terrorism did generate studies examining political movements from the perspective of psychopathology. 

In Terrorism and Liberalism (2003), Paul Berman compares suicidal violence in the Middle East with the suicidal violence of the Nazis, observing that Nazis were victimizers, but also the “boldest, greatest and most sublime of death’s victims.” Just as Nazis died for Hitler and Germany, so suicide bombers at the World Trade Center died for Bin Laden and Allah.

Addressing the issue of collective psychopathology, Berman struggles. It is very odd, he writes, to think that millions or tens of millions of people might end up “joining a pathological political movement.” Individual madmen might step forward, but surely “millions of people are not going to choose death, and the Jonestowns of this world are not going to take over entire societies.”

Looking at the historical record, we can only conclude that this has been the case: tens-of-millions of people have joined pathological political movements. Millions of people chose death. On many occasions during the 20th century, Jonestowns of the world did take over entire societies--on a scale that dwarfs what occurred at Jonestown.

Why does Berman find it difficult to say this--to state, actually, the obvious?

It's as if--when psychopathology occurs within the framework of political or "normal" society, we refuse to speak of psychopathology. We refuse to acknowledge that entire societies may be "sick." Indeed, we prefer not to contemplate the idea that psychopathology within human societies is the norm rather than an aberration.

I noted that over 200 million people died in the 20th century as a result of political violence initiated by nations and ideological movements. Some of the best-known cases of political slaughter occurred in Stalin’s Soviet Union, Mao’s China, Pol Pot’s Cambodia and of course in Nazi Germany.

Where are clinical studies of these enormous cultural events that brought death and injury to millions of human beings? Why do people find it easy to speak of psychopathology when analyzing the case of Jonestown, yet difficult to apply this language to episodes like the last days of Nazism—even though the magnitude and lethality of what occurred in Germany was so far greater?

The most obvious difference is that the Peoples Temple constituted a fringe group, whereas Nazism represented a political movement within a major Western nation. The Peoples Temple consisted of a small number of people, whereas Nazism constituted a mass movement with tens of millions of adherents. When so many people embrace a movement, we don’t ordinarily call it a cult. We don't want to call it a cult. A cult that becomes widely accepted becomes a "social movement." And destructive, pathological social movements transmogrify into "history."

Producing ample evidence to support his concept of political psychopathology, Berman scratches his head as if befuddled, refusing to embrace his own conclusions. “Is the world truly a place,” he asks, “where mass movements bedeck themselves in shrouds and march to the cemetery?”

It is time to embrace the reality that indeed the world is such a place. During the course of the 20th century, political leaders created mass movements that persuaded people to march to the cemetery.

I propose the idea of collective psychopathology: conceptualization of forms of psychopathology that are contained within the normal structures of society. 

Historical writing, typically, does not think of events in these terms. Historians function primarily to report and record what happened. The nature of the historical craft is to normalize whatever has occurred, however destructive, strange or bizarre events may seem.

What is the meaning of civilizational psychopathology—our tendency toward collective self-destruction? And what is the meaning of our desire to look away from societal forms of psychopathology, to pretend that--just because certains forms of behavior have occurred repeatedly--they are "normal."

The concept of “masochistic group death” used by Twemblow and Hough to describe what occurred at Jonestown is an entirely appropriate characterization of the Nazi case. Drumming up support for the war, Goebbels instructed Germans that it was their duty to die for Germany, proclaiming: “Fuehrer command! We will follow.” The German people followed Hitler and Goebbels into the valley of death. Goebbels led Germans to embrace masochistic group death.

Nazi leaders—like Jim Jones—seduced their people to die in the name of the movement that they embraced, embodied and promoted. They asked German soldiers to be obedient unto death. When told that 30,000 German officers had died in a futile effort to defend Berlin, Hitler declared, “But that’s what young men are for.”

Hitler and Goebbels promoted national suicide and eventually committed suicide themselves. They too “drank the Kool-Aid.” With the suicides of Hitler, Goebbels and their families, the Nazi movement reached its fulfillment and climax. Hitler’s death was the Final Solution. When Hitler died and the war ended, the German people began to awaken from  self-destructive fantasy that they had shared--and enacted.